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I. COURT OF APPEALS LEAVES FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY
ISSUE UNRESOLVED IN LIBEL AND INVASION OF PRIVACY CASE
In Parker v. Evening Post Publishing Co.1 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals held that a newspaper article about the sale of an automobile
dealership involved matters of public concern and thus applied the standard of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 and its progeny to a claim of libel and
invasion of privacy. 3 The primary issues on appeal were whether the trial
court (1) improperly charged the jury on a libel claim, and (2) improperly
entered a directed verdict on the plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim in an
action against a newspaper which had reported that he, as the purchaser of a
car dealership, might be liable for a judgment against the prior owner.4 The
court upheld the trial court's rulings on both issues.5 In so ruling, the court
passed up an opportunity to consider whether the tort of false light exists under
South Carolina law.6
The appellant, John Parker (Parker) contracted to purchase the assets of
Classic Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. (Classic) in December of 1988. Parker ran
newspaper and radio advertisements announcing his re-entry into the car
dealership business. Rather than following the procedures outlined in the
South Carolina Bulk Sales Act,7 the parties agreed that Classic would pay all
creditors and indemnify Parker for other claims. At that time, a complaint
was pending against Classic alleging fraud, conversion, and unfair trade
practices. In July of the following year, a jury verdict was returned against
Classic for $716,000.50. 8
In August of 1989, the respondent, Evening Post Publishing Co. (Evening
Post), ran an article reporting the verdict against Classic and intimating that
John Parker Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. might be liable for the judgment. Parker
subsequently brought suit against Evening Post for libel and a seperate cause
of action characterized as "false light/invasion of privacy. "I
At the trial, the Evening Post was granted a directed verdict on the
invasion of privacy claim based on "the absence of any South Carolina
1. _ S.C. _, 452 S.E.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1994).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Parker, _ S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 645.
4. Id. at __, 452 S.E.2d at 644.
5. Id. at __,452 S.E.2d at 645.
6. Id. at __ n.5, 452 S.E.2d at 646 n.5.
7. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-6-101 to -111 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
8. Parker, _ S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 642-43.
9. Id. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 643.
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authority recognizing the tort of 'false light.'"'10 On the libel claim, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of Evening Post.
On appeal, Parker challenged the lower court's jury instructions regarding
the burden of proving falsity of the statements in the article. "Parker
contend[ed] that he [was] a private figure and the subject matter of the article
was of purely private concern, thus placing his libel claim outside the realm
of constitutional defamation created by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and
its progeny."" Therefore, according to Parker, the common-law presump-
tion of falsity" should apply, and the burden of proving the truth should fall
on the respondents. The court of appeals found the common-law presumption
of falsity to be inappropriate in a case of public concern such as this, and held
that the constitutional standard for defamation, which requires the plaintiff to
prove falsity, was appropriately applied. 3
In framing its decision, the court of appeals traced the history of
constitutional defamation 4 and its impact on common-law defamation. The
court determined that the dispositive issue in this case was "whether the article
involved a matter of public concern."" It held that here, as in Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,16 it was appropriate to require the plaintiff to
prove falsity because the entire article written and published by the respon-
dents involved matters of public concern.17
In considering this issue, the court relied on the seminal South Carolina
privacy case, Meetze v. Associated Press."' In Meetze the South Carolina
Supreme Court found that a twelve year-old mother and twenty year-old father
did not have a cause of action for libel against the defendant for publishing a
story concerning the birth of their son. 19. The court concluded that it was an
unusual occurrence and a matter of public interest that a twelve year-old girl
had given birth to a child.20 Applying Meetze to this case, the court of
appeals concluded:
10. Id. at ,452 S.E.2d at 646.
11. Id. at 452 S.E.2d at 644 (citation omitted).
12. Defamatory statements are presumed to be false under the common law. F. PATRICK
HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SouTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 398 (1990).
13. Parker, __ S.C. at __, 452 S.E.2d at 644.
14. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (requiring private
figure plaintiff to prove falsity in matters of public concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974) (limiting common-law defamation standards concerning private figures and
matters of public concern); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (concerning
defamation of public officials).
15. Parker, - S.C. at __, 452 S.E.2d at 644.
16. 475 U.S. 767.
17. Parker, - S.C. at ,452 S.E.2d at 645.
18. 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 338, 95 S.E.2d at 610.
[Vol. 47
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss1/12
TORT LAW
If the public has a legitimate interest in knowing that a twelve year-old girl
gave birth to a child as a matter of law, it likewise has a legitimate interest
in knowing that the purchaser of a car dealership may be liable for the
debts of the former owner as a matter of law.
The court of appeals reasoned that because Parker invited public interest
in his ownership of the dealership through radio and newspaper advertisements
he could not now claim that the public did not have an interest in his potential
liability for judgments against that dealership.' Therefore, the entire news
article (including the portions referring to Classic) was held to concern matters
of public interest, placing Parker's claim within the framework of constitution-
al defamation and the burden of proving falsity on Parker.'
The court rejected Parker's argument that Holtzscheiter v. Thomson
Newspapers, Inc.24 pertained to this case, stating that in Holtzscheiter the
supreme court had found that the murder of a seventeen year-old girl was a
matter of public concern but the status of her home life was not.' The court
of appeals found that Holtzscheiter did not apply because the article in
Holtzscheiter arguably contained both public and private matters26 and the
court of appeals had already determined that the Parker article contained only
matters of public interest.
Parker also claimed recovery under false light or invasion of privacy
theories. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdict
against Parker on this claim. While the court refused to rule on whether South
Carolina recognizes the tort of false light,27 it relied on Rycroft v. Gadd?
in concluding that a cause of action for invasion of privacy requires the public
disclosure of "private facts which are of no legitimate public concern."
29
Because it had already determined that the article did not concern matters of
private interest, the court of appeals concluded that Parker could not support
a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
In declining to rule on the claim of false light, the court of appeals left
unresolved the question of whether the tort of false light will be recognized in
21. Parker, - S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 645.
22. Id. at 452 S.E.2d at 645.
23. Id. at __, 452 S.E.2d at 645-46.
24. 306 S.C. 297, 411 S.E.2d 664 (1991).
25. Parker, _ S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 646. Contrary to the court of appeals' reading
of Holtzscheiter, the private/publicdistinction was not addressed by the majority in that case, but
rather, was raised only by the two dissenting judges. See Holtzscheiter, 306 S.C. at 307, 411
S.E.2d at 669 (Toal, J., dissenting).
26. Parker, __ S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 646.
27. Id. at _ n.5, 452 S.E.2d at 646 n.5.
28. 281 S.C. 119, 314 S.E.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1984).
29. Parker, _ S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 646.
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South Carolina. In the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement), an action
for false light is recognized as a form of invasion of privacy." Section 652E
of the Restatement describes false light:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the
other would be placed.'
Because of the falsity requirement, false light invasion of privacy is similar to
defamation. However, unlike defamation actions, the Restatement definition
of false light does not distinguish between statements concerning public facts
and those concerning private facts; the Restatement requires only that those
facts be false.
32
The standard of liability to be used in false light cases has not been fully
settled. In the false light case of Time, Inc. v. Hill,33 the United States
Supreme Court applied the defamation standard set forth in the defamation
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.34 However, in Cantrell v. Forest
City Publishing Co.3" the Court declined to consider "whether a more relaxed
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of false statements injurious
to a private individual under a false-light theory of invasion of privacy, or
whether the constitutional standard announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to
all false-light cases."
36
The Supreme Court's treatment of the falsity requirement reflects the
similarities between defamation and false light invasion of privacy. Perhaps
the similarity between these torts is responsible for the Parker court's
reluctance to rule on whether South Carolina recognizes false light invasion
of privacy. However, in spite of the similarities, there are significant
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976).
31. Id.
32. Id. cmt. a.
33. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times Co. the court held that public officials could
recover only if the false and defamatory publicationwas proved by clear and convincing evidence
to have been made by the defendant with knowledge of the falsity of the statement or with a
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Id.
35. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
36. Id. at 250-51.
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differences between defamation and false light, and thus perhaps a need for
both causes of action in this state.
According to one commentator, although some false light and defamation
claims overlap, defamation is an inadequate cause of action.37 There are
areas where false light becomes an issue of "genuine practical importance."38
Professor Schwartz "proposes a certain division of responsibility between the
defamation and false light torts, with defamation exercising jurisdiction over
statements that are disparagingly false while false light assumes authority over
false statements that are highly offensive even though nondisparaging. "
Nondisparaging false statements which cast a plaintiff in a false light might
involve private aspects of a plaintiff's life; false claims about a plaintiffs
personal thoughts and emotions; false portrayal of severe victimization of a
plaintiff; and false virtues attributed to a plaintiff that were not earned.'
Because these types of nondisparaging false statements would not defame a
plaintiff's reputation, the tort of false light would afford a plaintiff relief. A
limited number of legitimate causes of action may therefore go unredressed
because the tort of false light has not been recognized.
Despite the theoretical differences between the two causes of action, the
court of appeals did not address the issue of false light because it found the
appellant's argument "so conclusory as to be an abandonment of the issue. "4
Accordingly, Parker provides no insight into whether South Carolina courts
will recognize the tort of false light.
Robin L. Blume
I. COURT HOLDS PHARMACISTS HAvE No DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
AND DISCUSSES TORT OF NEGLIGENT FALSEHOOD
In Evans v. Rite Aid Corp.' the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that South Carolina law imposes neither a common-law nor a statutory duty
of confidentiality on pharmacists. 2 Additionally, the court held that a party
may not recharacterize a defamation claim as a tort of negligent falsehood in
order to circumvent the statute of limitations.3
37. Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion of
Privacy, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 885, 887-90 (1991).
38. Id. at 893.
39. Id. at 900.
40. Id. at 893-96.
41. Parker, _ S.C. at _ n.5, 452 S.E.2d at 646 n.5.
1. _ S.C. _, 452 S.E.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1994).
2. Id. at_, 452 S.E.2d at 11.
3. Id. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 12.
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In October 1989 the plaintiff, Evans, had a prescription filled at a Rite
Aid pharmacy in Walterboro, South Carolina. Evans alleged that an employee
of the pharmacy falsely stated to third parties that the prescription was for the
treatment of a sexually transmitted disease (STD).4 Evans claimed she
suffered substantial physical and emotional harm as a result of the disclosure.5
In October 1992 Evans filed a complaint against Rite Aid in Charleston
County Court claiming damages for breach of confidentiality, negligent failure
to supervise, and outrage.6 The trial judge granted Rite Aid's motion to
dismiss without prejudice and allowed Evans leave to amend the complaint.7
In her amended complaint, Evans alleged negligent falsehood, negligent failure
to supervise, and outrage. The trial judge denied Rite Aid's second motion to
dismiss the claim of negligent falsehood, construing it as a claim for
defamation.8 The judge declined to decide whether Evans had properly pled
a claim for negligent misrepresentation and granted Rite Aid's second motion
to dismiss for the claims of negligent failure to supervise and outrage. Rite
Aid's motion for summary judgment on the defamation cause of action was
granted because the two year statute of limitations9 had run before Evans filed
her first complaint.1° Ultimately, Rite Aid's motion for summary judgment
on the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation was granted."
Evans appealed the dismissal of the first complaint, arguing that
pharmacists owe their customers a duty of confidentiality. She also argued that
the second complaint properly stated a claim for negligent falsehood. She did
not appeal the dismissal of her claims for outrage and negligent supervision,
nor did she challenge the lower court's finding that the second complaint did
not properly state a claim for negligent misrepresentation.'
The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that pharmacists do not owe
their customers a statutory duty of confidentiality. Evans argued that public
policy concerns reflected in statutory and regulatory schemes for preventing
the spread of contagious diseases, especially sexually transmitted diseases
(STDs), impose a duty of confidentiality on pharmacists. The court rejected
this argument, finding that the statutes and regulations concerning the
reporting of information about STDs and the confidentiality of that information
4. Id. at_, 452 S.E.2d at 10.
5. Id. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 12.
6. Evans, _ S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 10.
7. Id. at , 452 S.E.2d at 10.
8. Id. at 452 S.E.2d at 10.
9. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-550(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
10. Evans, __ S.C. at _ n.3, 452 S.E.2d at 11 n.3.
11. Id. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 10.
12. Id. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 10.
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do not apply to pharmacies and therefore did not create a duty of confidentiali-
ty for Rite Aid. 1
3
The relevant South Carolina statutes and regulations impose a strict duty
of confidentiality on certain classes of people.14 Section 44-29-135 of the
South Carolina Code requires that "[a]ll information and records held by the
Department of Health and Environmental Control and its agents relating to a
known or suspected case of a sexually transmitted disease are strictly
confidential .... "1 This information can be disclosed only in certain
circumstances. 16
State regulations also reinforce the confidential nature of this information.
Regulation 61-21 stipulates- that "[a]ll information and reports in connection
with persons infected with sexually transmitted diseases shall be kept strictly
confidential in accordance with state law."17 Regulations promulgated by the
Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) concerning STDs
are binding on all county and municipal health officials, doctors, and others
who treat or diagnose cases of sexually transmitted diseases."
The Evans court held that "while Regulation 61-21 may impose a duty of
confidentiality on those required to report cases of STDs, Rite Aid is not
included in this group."" Because pharmacists are not required to report to
DHEC when they fill a prescription for the treatment of a STD, Rite Aid was
held not to owe a statutory duty of confidentiality to its customers.
20
The court of appeals also quickly concluded that there is no common-law
duty of confidentiality between pharmacists and their customers. Evans argued
that because there was no case law explicitly rejecting such a duty, the issue
of the existence of the duty was a question of fact or at the least a question of
13. Id. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 10-11.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-29-70 to -90; 44-29-135 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE
REGs. 61-21 (1992 & Supp. 1994). The statutory requirements for reporting STDs to the
Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) apply to physicians, other health care
providers who diagnose STDs, and managers of health care facilities, charitable institutions, and
penal institutions, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); laboratories, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-29-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); and state, district, county, and municipal
health officers, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-90 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994). In addition to these
persons, Regulation 61-21 requires blood banks and plasma centers to report STDs to DHEC.
S.C. CODE REGS. 61-21(c) (1992).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-135 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
16. Id. DHEC may release information about STIDs when needed for statistical purposes,
when its necessary for the control and treatment of STDs, or to protect the life or health of an
individual, and when the Child Protection Act of 1977 requires the reporting of information about
a minor to the proper agents. Id.
17. S.C. CODE REGS. 61-21(C)(3) (1992).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
19. Evans, _ S.C. at __, 452 S.E.2d at 11.
20. Id. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 11.
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fact and law. Therefore, Evans asserted that the issue was not appropriate for
dismissal as a matter of law. The court rejected this argument, stating that
"[w]hether a particular duty exists is a question of law for the court"2' and
affirmed the lower court's decision that pharmacists do not owe their
customers a common-law duty of confidentiality.'
The other issue on appeal in Evans was whether the second complaint
pled facts sufficient to support a claim for negligent falsehood. Evans alleged
that Rite Aid's pharmacist "'had negligently and recklessly . . . reported and
alleged to numerous persons the falsehood that the prescription purchased by
the appellant was for treatment of venereal disease.'" ' South Carolina law
requires three elements for a cause of action in negligence: "(1) the existence
of a duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff; (2) the failure of
the defendant to discharge the duty; (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from
the defendant's failure to perform."24 The court held that Rite Aid owed no
duty to Evans, and thus because Evans lacked this essential element of a
negligence claim, the trial court properly dismissed Evans' negligent falsehood
cause of action.'
Evans relied solely on South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Booz-A lien
& Hamilton, Inc.26 to support her claim for negligent falsehood. In Booz-All-
en the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could maintain an
action in negligence for false information that the defendant gave to a third
party.27 With the intent of attracting more business, the port of Savannah
hired the defendant Booz-Allen & Hamilton (Booz-Allen) to write a report
comparing the port of Savannah with its rival port of Charleston. Booz-Allen
did not contact the Charleston Ports Authority while preparing the report,
which was highly favorable to Savannah and contained several false facts about
the port of Charleston. Recognizing that a duty to a third party may arise out
of a defendant's contractual relationship, the supreme court held that Booz-
Allen owed the Charleston Ports Authority a duty to use due care when it
undertook to objectively conduct the study of Charleston's commercial
competitors.2
The Evans court did not find Booz-Allen applicable. The Booz-Allen
holding was limited to a contractual duty arising between a consultant and a
21. Id. at_, 452 S.E.2d at 11 (citing Ballou v. Sigma Nu Gen. Fraternity, 291 S.C. 140,
352 S.E.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1986)).
22. Id. at_, 452 S.E.2d at 11.
23. Id. at, 452 S.E.2d at 11.
24. South Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C. 373,376, 346
S.E.2d 324, 325 (1986) (citations omitted).
25. Evans, __ S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 12.
26. 289 S.C. 373, 346 S.E.2d 324 (1986).
27. Id. at 377, 346 S.E.2d at 326.
28. Id. at 376-77, 346 S.E.2d at 326.
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third party competitor that was a subject of the consultant's report. Evans is
certainly distinguishable because it did not involve a special relation between
Rite Aid and a third party that would give rise to a duty owed by Rite Aid to
Evans. In addition, the court rejected Evans' argument that a contractual duty
of confidentiality arose from Evans' purchase of the medicine. As the court
noted, "Evans cites no authority for the contention that a customer's purchase
of medicine from a druggist gives rise to a contractual duty not to disseminate
information regarding the sale, and we find none." 29 Because Evans failed
to establish that Rite Aid owed a duty to her, the court affirmed the trial court
dismissal of her claim for negligent falsehood."
* Finally, the court noted that Evans' claim actually stated a claim for
defamation. 31 The Supreme Court of South Carolina has described the
elements of defamation as follows: "[Tihe words, on their face or by reason
of extrinsic facts, must tend to impeach the reputation of the plaintiff.... To
be actionable, the [defamatory statement], as a result of its tendency to
impeach or injure the plaintiff's reputation, must thereby injure him. "32 More
specifically, "[i]n South Carolina words are actionable per se when they...
plainly and falsely charge the contraction of a contagious disease, adultery or
a want of chastity or unfitness in the way of a professional trade. "33
Had she brought her action in time, the tort of defamation might have
offered Evans an avenue for recovery for her alleged injuries. However,
because the cause of action was almost three years old at the time of filing of
the original complaint, Evans conceded that the two year statute of limitations
barred her defamation claim. No doubt aware of these circumstances, the court
explained that it would not permit Evans to "circumvent the statute by simply
characterizing her claim as one of negligent falsehood. 
"3
The court of appeals has consistently refused to recognize other torts
when a cause of action for defamation would best remedy a plaintiff's injuries.
For example, in Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance35 the
court held:
The tort of outrage was designed not as a replacement for the existing tort
actions. Rather, it was conceived as a remedy for tortious conduct where
no remedy previously existed. Here an action for defamation, which is the
29. Evans, - S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 12 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 12.
31. Id. at_, 452 S.E.2d at 12.
32. Capps v. Watts, 271 S.C. 276, 281, 246 S.E.2d 606, 609 (1978) (citation omitted).
33. Smith v. Phoenix Furniture Co., 339 F. Supp. 969,971 (D.S.C. 1972) (citations omitted).
34. Evans, - S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 12.
35. 283 S.C. 155, 321 S.E.2d 602 (Ct. App. 1984).
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usual remedy to be employed against one who has published falsehoods,
is available to [the plaintiff]. 6
In Folkens v. Hunt37 the court similarly affirmed the granting of summary
judgment to the defendant on the cause of action of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, or outrage. The court noted, "[a]t most, [the defendant]
defamed [the plaintiff] by making false accusations of criminal conduct. Such
conduct, obviously, can give rise to a claim for slander, the usual remedy to
be employed against one who publishes a falsehood about another person."38
Distilled to its essence, Evans represents an attempt to skirt the defama-
tion statute of limitations by recasting the complaint in terms of a breach of
duty of confidentiality or, alternatively, as a claim for negligent falsehood. By
holding that South Carolina does not impose a duty of confidentiality between
a pharmacist and his customers, and by refusing to find that Evans established
a cause of action for negligence, the Evans court demonstrated that it will not
create new duties and causes of actions merely to sustain a claim that would
otherwise be barred by a shorter statute of limitations.
Jennifer D. Bush
IL. COURT CONSIDERS LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY FOR
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, ADOPTION OF DOCTRINE OF
CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE
In Strickland v. Madden' the South Carolina Court of Appeals considered
the issue of recovery for emotional trauma under a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, holding that absent proof of physical
injury, recovery is limited to so-called "bystander recovery." 2 When,
however, a plaintiff can prove that bodily injury was proximately caused by
emotional trauma, then a plaintiff need not meet the requirements of bystander
liability and may recover for such trauma as an element of damages.3 By
establishing two distinct paths to recovery under this cause of action,
Strickland will make it easier for plaintiffs to recover for emotional distress as
an element of compensatory damages. The court also considered the issue of
hospital liability for a breach of duty to patients to monitor and control the
competence of physicians using hospital facilities, suggesting in dicta that the
36. Id. at 173, 321 S.E.2d at 613.
37. 290 S.C. 194, 348 S.E.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1986).
38. Id. at 204, 348 S.E.2d at 845 (citing Phoenix Furniture Co., 399 F. Supp. 969).
1. - S.C. _, 448 S.E.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam).
2. Id. at _, 448 S.E.2d at 583.
3. Id. at __, 448 S.E.2d at 584.
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court might adopt the doctrine of corporate negligence employed by other
jurisdictions to create such a duty of care.
Evangeline Strickland (Strickland) sued Dr. Arthur Madden (Madden) and
Providence Hospital (Providence) to recover for emotional and physical
injuries she suffered when Madden incorrectly informed her that her father had
died.5 Strickland alleged that Madden entered a waiting room where she and
her brother were awaiting the outcome of medical efforts to revive their father
and gestured with his thumbs pointing down. He then told them that their
father had died. Strickland's brother characterized Madden's speech as slurred.
Moreover, Madden allegedly "chided" her and her brother for insisting upon
their father's revival, stating that they were fortunate he had lived a long life.6
A nurse later told Strickland that her father was still alive.7
Strickland, who previously worked in the records department at
Providence, alleged that she had heard rumors that Madden had a drinking
problem and recalled one incident when Madden appeared impaired! The
president of the hospital at the time of the incident testified at trial that nursing
supervisors had twice reported smelling alcohol on Madden's breath and
further testified that on one occasion Madden did not respond to a call to
check on one of his patients until he received a second call from the hospital.9
However, the president also stated that she had neither received a complaint
about the quality of Madden's patient care, nor found Madden's patient care
to have been affected by his conduct."1
Strickland sued on two causes of action: negligent infliction of emotional
distress and outrage." She attempted to hold the hospital liable, in addition
to Dr. Madden, on a theory of apparent agency. 12 The court affirmed the trial
court's granting of summary judgment as to the outrage claim against the
doctor and the apparent agency claim against the hospital, but reversed
summary judgment against the plaintiff on the issue of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 3
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court and the doctor that a
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress without proof of
4. Id. at_, 448 S.E.2d at 586 (noting that "other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine of
corporate negligence to impose on hospitals a non-delegable duty to patients to carefully select
and review the competency of physicians using their facilities").
5. Id. at _, 448 S.E.2d at 583.
6. Strickland, - S.C. at _, 448 S.E.2d at 583.
7. Id. at __,448 S.E.2d at 583.
8. Id. at __,448 S.E.2d at 583.
9. Id. at 448 S.E.2d at 583.
10. Id. at __, 448 S.E.2d at 583.
11. Strickland, - S.C. at _, 448 S.E.2d at 583.
12. Id. at _,448 S.E.2d at 585.
13. Id. at 448 S.E.2d at 586.
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physical injury is limited to bystander liability. 4 However, the court found
that this case did not involve bystander liability because Strickland's amended
complaint alleged bodily injury. 5 It therefore determined that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment because, as a matter of law, Strickland
could recover for emotional trauma if she could prove that her alleged bodily
injury was proximately caused by her emotional trauma.16
A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress was first
expressly adopted in South Carolina in Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co.17
Kinard limited recovery under this cause of action to "by-stander recov-
ery," 8 adopting a five-part test which, inter alia, required the bystander to
be in close proximity to the accident, be closely related to the victim, and
contemporaneously perceive the accident. 9 Madden argued that the case
against him should also be governed by Kinard and that the trial court
correctly granted summary judgment when Strickland failed to meet Kinard's
bystander liability requirements. The Strickland court disagreed, pointing out
that Stricldand alleged in her amended complaint that she suffered "'severe
bodily and mental injuries and damages'" and stating that Strickland was not
limited to the Kinard analysis if she could prove her bodily injury was
proximately caused by her emotional trauma.' ° Thus, to recover for emotion-
al distress a plaintiff must suffer some physical injury or qualify for bystander
status." That is, a plaintiff who has not suffered bodily injury must fulfill the
14. Id. at __, 448 S.E.2d at 583-84.
15. Id. at __, 448 S.E.2d at 584.
16. Strickland, _ S.C. at _, 448 S.E.2d at 584 (citing Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale
Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958) and Spaugh v. A.C.L. Ry., 158 S.C. 25, 155
S.E. 145 (1930)).
17. 286 S.C. 579, 336 S.E.2d 465 (1985).
18. Id. at 582 & n.2, 336 S.E.2d at 467 & n.2.
19. Approving the approach of Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), the Kinard court
specified the following elements for the tort:
(a) the negligence of the defendant must cause death or serious physical injury
to another;
(b) the plaintiff bystander must be in close proximity to the accident;
(c) the plaintiff and the victim must be closely related;
(d) the plaintiff must contemporaneously perceive the accident; and
(e) the emotionhi distress must both manifest itself by physical symptoms
capable of objective diagnosis and be established by expert testimony.
Kinard, 286 S.C. at 582-83, 336 S.E.2d at 467.
20. Strickland, _ S.C. at __, 448 S.E.2d at 583-84 (citing Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale
Dist. Co., 232 S.C. at 593, 106 S.E.2d 265 (1958) and Spaugh v. A.C.L. Ry., 158 S.C. 25, 155
S.E. 145 (1930) for the proposition that a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress when such
distress is manifested by physical symptoms).
21. See Kinard, 286 S.C. 579, 336 S.E.2d 465; Dooley v. Richland Memorial Hosp., 283
S.C. 372, 375, 322 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1984); see also F.P. HUBBARD & R.L. FELIX, THE SOUTH
CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 481-85 (1990) (discussing the South Carolina law of emotional
12
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Kinard definition of bystander. A plaintiff who suffers bodily injury, on the
other hand, need not fulfill the Kinard definition of an eligible bystander, but
must prove physical injury.
In addition to suing Dr. Madden, Strickland attempted to hold the hospital
liable under the doctrines of apparent authority and corporate negligence.'
Apparent authority is a basis for holding a principal liable when the principal
manifests that an agent has certain authority and a third party reasonably relies
on that manifestation.' The court stated that to prove apparent authority
Strickland needed to show: "(1) the hospital consciously or impliedly
represented Madden to be its agent; (2) there was reliance upon the representa-
tion; and (3) she detrimentally changed positions."24 The court found that
Strickland did not offer any evidence to support the elements of reliance and
change of position.'
Strickland sought to apply the doctrine of corporate negligence, which
"impose[s] on hospitals a non-delegable duty to patients to carefully select and
review the competency of physicians using their facilities"' even when those
doctors are not hospital employees. That is, the concept of corporate
negligence focuses on a hospital's direct duty to its patients that exists outside
the basis of respondeat superior.27 In disposing of Strickland's argument that
the hospital was negligent in failing to withdraw Madden's staff privileges, the
court analyzed her claim "[a]ssuming South Carolina would [like other
jurisdictions] recognize the doctrine of corporate negligence."8 The court,
however, found that because Strickland failed to allege a standard of care,
summary judgment against her was appropriate. 29
distress).
22. Strickland, _ S.C. at , 448 S.E.2d at 585-86.
23. Vereen v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 306 S.C. 423, 428, 412 S.E.2d 425, 428 (Ct. App.
1991).
24. Strickland, _ S.C. at _, 448 S.E.2d at 585 (citing Shuler v. Tuomey Regional
Medical Ctr., Inc., __ S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1993)).
25. Id. at, 448 S.E.2d at 585. The difficulty for plaintiffs in proceeding under an apparent
authority theory in a medical context is that most doctors operate as independent contractors and
are not hospital employees. Generally, an employer is not legally responsible for the torts of an
independent contractor. South Carolina Natural Gas Co. v. Phillips, 289 F.2d 143, 146 (4th Cir.
1961); Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 221 S.C. 477, 487, 71 S.E.2d 299, 303 (1952).
26. Strickland, _ S.C. at _, 448 S.E.2d at 586.
27. Jones v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 286 S.E.2d 374, 376 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); see
also Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965) (considered
by commentators as the origin of the doctrine of corporate negligence dealing with the nature and
extent of a hospital's direct duty to its patients), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
28. Strickland, _ S.C. at _, 448 S.E.2d at 586.
29. Id. at _, 448 S.E.2d at 586.
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Corporate negligence has not yet been expressly adopted in South
Carolina.3" In its discussion of that concept, the Strickland court noted the
policy underpinning the imposition of a duty running from the hospital to its
patients: the public's perception of and reliance on hospitals as multi-faceted
health care facilities, as well as hospitals' superior position to monitor and
control physician performance.3 1 Courts in nearby jurisdictions have already
taken note of this rationale. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, for
example, has held that when a physician is a "manager" of a hospital, such as
in the case of a director of respiratory services and chief of anesthesiology, the
hospital must accept liability for the physician .3 North Carolina has also
accepted the doctrine of corporate negligence. 3 Whether South Carolina will
follow this lead is uncertain, but Strickland's tone suggests that at least the
court of appeals may be ready to adopt the doctrine.
Strickland makes clear that there are two paths to recovery for emotional
distress in a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress: proof
of physical injury or fulfillment of the Kinard bystander requirements. Perhaps
more importantly, the court of appeals appears to have recognized that the
changed structure of the modem hospital calls for some changes in apparent
agency and negligence analysis. The facts of Strickland may not have given the
court sufficient justification to include the hospital as a wrongfully-acting
defendant, but the court has sounded a definite warning to hospitals in South
Carolina that they could be held liable in the future for a physician's tortious
acts under corporate negligence theory.
Robin Sloan Cromer
IV. COURT OF APPEALS EXPANDS POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF BUSINESSES
FOR THE CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL BY MINORS
In Norton v. Opening Break of Aiken' the South Carolina Court of
Appeals held that a business licensed to serve alcoholic beverages could be
liable for injuries to a third party resulting from a minor's consumption of
alcohol on the business premises, even though the business did not in any way
30. Id. at 448 S.E.2d at 586.
31. Id. at, 448 S.E.2d at 586 (citing Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984) (en
banc)).
32. Thomas v. Raleigh Gen. Hosp., 358 S.E.2d 222, 225 (W. Va. 1987).
33. Jones; 286 S.E.2d at 376; see also Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. Ct. App.)
(recognizing corporate negligence as a basis for liability apart and distinct from respondeat
superior), review denied, 269 S.E.2d 621 (N.C. 1980).
1. __ S.C. _, 443 S.E.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1994).
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provide or serve alcohol to the minor.2 The court of appeals has expanded
the potential liability of owners of bars, restaurants, and other businesses
licensed to serve alcohol in South Carolina by finding that violation of a state
regulation governing liquor licenses provides a private cause of action in
negligence.3
Opening Break of Aiken was a business licensed to sell alcohol in South
Carolina.4 Twenty-year old Christopher Yonce attended an after hours party
at Opening Break held for one of Opening Break's employees. Only the
facility was being used; no alcohol was provided by the bar and no employee
of Opening Break provided Yonce with alcohol.5 Rather, Yonce drank
several beers at the party which he had brought himself and some alcoholic
punch provided by another partygoer. Several hours after the party Yonce
crashed his car into another car, killing Jerry S. Horton.6
Horton's estate brought an action against Opening Break claiming it
violated a duty of care prescribed by South Carolina Regulation 7-31.'
Regulation 7-31, promulgated by the Alcohol Beverage Control Commission,
states in part:
To permit or knowingly allow a person under twenty-one years of age to
possess or consume alcoholic liquors in or on a licensed place of business
which holds a license or permit issued by the South Carolina Alcoholic
Beverage Control Commission is prohibited and constitutes a violation
against the license and permit.8
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant.9 The trial
court refused to find a private cause of action based on a duty to control the
premises so that minors "do not consume alcohol, noting that in all related
cases liability had been based on a sale of alcohol to the underage person. The
plaintiff appealed the ruling. 10
On appeal, the court analyzed the case as a question of negligence per
se." The court first examined Regulation 7-31 to determine if it established
a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff." In order to find a
2. Id. at 443 S.E.2d at 406.
3. Id. at _, 443 S.E.2d at 406.
4. Id. at , 443 S.E.2d at 407.
5. Id. at _,443 S.E.2d at 407.
6. Norton, _ S.C. at _, 443 S.E.2d at 407.
7. Id. at _, 443 S.E.2d at 408.
8. S.C. CODE REGS. 7-31 (Supp. 1994).
9. Norton, - S.C. at _, 443 S.E.2d at 407.
10. Record at 7.
11. Norton, __ S.C. at_, 443 S.E.2d at 408.
12. Id. at _, 443 S.E.2d at 408.
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duty of care arising from a regulation the court looked for two things:
"'(1) that the essential purpose of the statute is to protect from the kind of
harm the plaintiff has suffered; and (2) that he is a member of the class of
persons the statute is intended to protect.'"' The defendant argued that the
deceased was not a member of the class the regulation was intended to protect
because the regulation was intended to protect only underage persons.'" The
court rejected the defendant's argument, holding that the regulation was
designed to protect both the minor who consumes the alcohol and those in the
general public likely to be harmed by the consumption. 5 The court did not
consider the merits of the case and remanded it for trial.' 6
No previous cases in South Carolina had found a business liable merely
because a minor consumed alcohol on the premises. The court in Norton drew
upon several related precedents, relying heavily upon the test annunciated by
the South Carolina Supreme Court in Whitlaw v. Kroger Co.'7
Whitlaw involved a minor who purchased beer and then gave some of the
beer to another minor.'" The other minor was injured as a result of consum-
ing the beer.' 9 In considering whether South Carolina Code sections 61-9-40
and 61-9-410(1) supported a private cause of action by the injured minor
against the seller of the alcohol, the court determined that the statutes were
designed (1) to protect the minor who purchased the alcohol and (2) to protect
members of the public harmed by the minor's consumption. 20 The court in
Norton followed this reasoning to find that Regulation 7-31 imposed a duty of
care on Opening Break.
Several justifications have been advanced for imposing liability upon
businesses that provide alcohol to certain groups of people, including minors.
One is "that the liability proceeds from the duty of care that accompanies
control of the liquor supply."2 Another is that a commercial vendor is in a
good position to monitor the individual buying the alcohol.' Other justifica-
13. Id. at __, 443 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting Whitlaw v. Kroger Co., 306 S.C. 51, 53, 410
S.E.2d 251, 252 (1991)).
14. Id. at _443 S.E.2d at 408.
15. Id. at ,443 S.E.2d at 408-09.
16. Norton, __ S.C. at __, 443 S.E.2d at 409.
17. 306 S.C. 51, 410 S.E.2d 251 (1991) (per curiam).
18. Id. at 53, 410 S.E.2d at 252.
19. Id.
20. Whitlaw, 306 S.C. at 54-55, 410 S.E.2d at 253; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-9-40(A) (Law.
Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1994) ("It is unlawful for any person to sell beer ... to a person...
under twenty-one years of age."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-9-410(1) (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp.
1994) (prohibiting a holder of an alcohol permit from knowingly selling beer or wine to a person
under twenty-one years of age).
21. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (N.J. 1984) (comparing social host liability and
commercial vendor liability for serving alcohol).
22. Runge v. Watts, 589 P.2d 145, 147 (Mont. 1979) (distinguishing between social host and
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tions are that sellers "(1) can purchase extensive liability insurance to bear the
loss; (2) can spread the cost of insurance by increasing prices; (3) have
expertise in judging whether a person is a minor or is intoxicated; and (4) can
control the patron's consumption."' Most of the justifications mentioned
above are based upon the unique position of a seller of alcohol. The seller
controls the supply of alcohol, is in a good position to monitor who buys the
alcohol, and ultimately can control the consumption of alcohol by a particular
person. A business on whose premises a minor consumes alcohol, however,
may not always be in any special position to guard against a minor's
consumption. A business that simply allows its facility to be used for or rents
its facility for a private party, for example, may not have employees present
at the function. In such a situation it would be difficult, if not impossible, for
the business to control any particular person's consumption of alcohol.
Another justification for imposing liability on a seller of alcohol is that
"[i]t is more equitable to impose the cost of accidents on those making a profit
from the sale of intoxicants than on an innocent, injured third party."'24 This
justification is not present in a situation like that encountered by the court in
Norton, where the business derived no profit from the minor's consumption
of alcohol.
An important factor supporting imposition of a duty of care in a case like
Norton is the basic goal of deterring the consumption of alcohol by minors.
This goal may be furthered by forcing businesses to root out any possible
underage drinking which could occur on their premises. Other goals include
the compensation of victims and the spreading of accident costs to the sellers
of alcohol, who are better able to afford insurance. Though these reasons may
support a theory of "faultless liability," Norton was expressly decided on the
theory of negligence. Implicit in the concept of negligence is fault. The
Norton court, however, does not address fault and appears to find a duty based
solely on a business being licensed to serve alcohol.
Many questions remain regarding the extent of the duty imposed by
Regulation 7-31. Do licensed businesses have a duty to guard against
underage drinking even when their only connection is that the drinking occurs
on their premises? What steps must businesses take to ensure that alcohol is
not consumed on their premises by underage persons? Can businesses ever
allow the private use of their facilities without stationing an employee to make
sure no underage drinking occurs?
commercial vendor liability).
23. Jon R. Erickson & Donna H. Hamilton, Comment, Liability of Commercial Vendors,
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Several interesting hypotheticals can be posed to explore the limits of
Norton. Consider, for example, a situation where a business licensed to sell
alcohol rents its premises to a wedding party for a reception. The business
provides no services. The wedding party hires its own caterer who serves
food and alcohol. At the wedding an underage guest consumes alcohol and as
a result injures a third person. Would the business that rented the facility be
liable for the underage guest's injury? Norton suggests that the answer is yes.
If a licensed business which occasionally rents out its facility can be held liable
for underage drinking, what actions must a business take to guard against
liability? Must the business check the identification of everyone at the
reception to make sure they are old enough to drink the alcohol which the
wedding party has provided?
By limiting the holding to its facts, Norton can be read in a way which
would limit the burdens placed upon businesses and bring the decision in line
with the justifications which usually underlie liability regarding alcohol. One
determinative fact in the case could be that an employee was at the party at
Opening Break.' The presence of an employee puts the business in a good
position to guard against underage drinking and control the consumption
because an employee could ask any person to produce proof of age or depart
the premises.
Norton v. Opening Break of Aiken expands the potential liability of
businesses licensed to sell alcoholic beverages in South Carolina. Precisely
what Regulation 7-31 demands of potential defendants, however, remains
unclear and is likely to be the subject of additional litigation as courts define
the contours of the duty placed on such businesses by the regulation.
Vincent A. Sheheen
25. Norton, _ S.C. at _, 443 S.E.2d at 407.
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